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Abstract: In Canada, targeting the inflation rate was intended as a temporary 
measure on a journey to price-level stability, but became a well-established 
monetary policy regime in its own right. This paper analyses the role of the 
interaction of economic ideas with the experience generated by their application to 
policy in bringing about this outcome. In the following account, changing beliefs 
about the stability or otherwise of ongoing inflation, the capacity of a flexible 
exchange rate to create a vicious circle of depreciation and rising domestic prices, 
and about the roles played by the natural unemployment rate and money growth in 
influencing economic outcomes are emphasised. Today’s standard DSGE approach 
to modelling inflation targeting arrived on the scene only after the Canadian 
regime was well established. 
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Inflation targeting is proving to be durable and popular. It emerged in the early 
1990s from a series of specific decisions taken in individual countries to deal with 
what seemed to be particular local problems, and without any immediately obvious 
precursors. 1  In one variant or another it has now spread, according to a recent 
count (Sarwat Jahan 2012), to 28 countries, a total that excludes the United States, 
where targeting remains informal. The role of economic ideas and events in driving 
this regime’s development and durability is surely worth some attention.  
Nowadays, the phrase “inflation targeting”, rather than merely specifying a 
policy goal, usually signifies a comprehensive policy program, a seamless blend of 
monetary-policy practice and macroeconomic theory. Its generic characteristics (to 
be referred to as “the standard model” in what follows) consist of : (i) a well-
defined policy target, specifically a quantitative goal (typically, as in the case of 
Canada, with a band around it) for the rate of change of some price index; (ii) a 
policy instrument under the control of the central bank, typically a very short-term 
nominal interest rate; (iii) an explicit  dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of the 
mechanisms linking the behaviour of the target to that of the instrument in 
question, usually consisting of (a), an expectations augmented Phillips curve, 
where the deviation of inflation from its expected rate varies with a so-called 
“output gap”, (b) a function specifying the relationship between aggregate demand 
and the policy instrument,  and (c), a model determining the time path of 
economy’s productive capacity, which in conjunction with (b) determines the 
output gap; and (iv) a policy reaction function, often a so-called “Taylor rule” (see 
e.g. John Taylor 1993), specifying how the central bank does, or should, adjust its 
policy instrument in the light of information about the current and perhaps forecast 
behaviour of inflation and the output gap in order to keep the target variable on 
track.   
The links between economic ideas and the conduct of inflation-targeting 
policy are thus extremely close these days, and anyone teaching serious students 
about this regime would certainly refer them to such basic theoretical works as, for 
example, Lars Svensson (1999), or Michael Woodford (2003), before turning to a 
discussion of the idiosyncrasies of any specific real-world examples, either existing 
or proposed. But it would be wrong to infer from all this that the macroeconomic 
theory we now associate with inflation targeting was always in the lead in the 
regime’s historical development over the last quarter century. Inflation targeting’s 
origins lay in rather different and less rigorous economic ideas, and in many places 
                                                 
1 The nearest precursor is probably the Bank of Sweden’s effort to stabilise the price level (rather than inflation rate) 
by manipulating the rate of interest for a few years following its abandonment of the gold standard in 1932. See 
Fisher and Cohrssen (1934) and Lars Jonung (1979) 
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its theory and practice evolved only slowly under the influence of events into 
today’s configuration.  
Broad cross-country studies (e.g. Bernanke and Mishkin 1997) of inflation-
targeting are both possible and valuable for many purposes, but in this paper I want 
to focus on a theme whose significance for the place in macroeconomic analysis of 
the history of economic thought I have explored in the past (see, e.g. Laidler 
2003a), namely the recursive interdependence of economic ideas and experience. 
Here a local narrative is appropriate, so I shall discuss the evolution of a particular 
inflation targeting regime, namely Canada’s. Because of its emphasis on ideas, 
what follows is organised as much along thematic as chronological lines, dealing in 
turn with the evolution in the light of experience of Canadian policy-makers’ 
beliefs about: price stability as a policy goal and the stability of positive inflation; 
the exchange rate as a source of price level instability; the natural unemployment 
rate; the place of the exchange rate in monetary policy’s transmission mechanism; 
and the role of money growth as a cause and/or indicator of future inflation. Then a 
few very tentative comments about the current configuration of Canadian monetary 
policy will be offered, but debates about how the regime might be modified in 
2016, when it is next due for renewal or revision, will not be entered.  
 
Price Stability or Low Inflation 
Canada was the second country (after New Zealand) to adopt explicitly 
quantitative inflation targets. It did so in February 1991 with a joint announcement 
from the Bank of Canada and the Federal Government in its budget for that year.2 
However, this announcement was regarded, by the Bank as much as by local 
academic and other commentators, not as heralding a new monetary policy regime 
but as, at most, significantly clarifying the nature and intended future course of one 
that had first been announced three years earlier, and already had attached to it a 
widely-used (though never in any communications emanating from the Bank of 
Canada) label, “zero inflation” (See Richard Lipsey (ed.) 1990). This regime had 
been launched in a public lecture – specifically a contribution to the University of 
Alberta’s Eric John Hanson Memorial Lecture Series, entitled “The Work of 
Canadian Monetary Policy” - delivered on January 18th 1988 by the Bank of 
Canada’s then newly appointed (1987) Governor, John W. Crow (Crow 1988a).3  
                                                 
 
2 Two co-authored books, David Laidler and William Robson (1993) and (2004) deal respectively with the 
macroeconomic history of the run-up to and initial implementation of this regime, and the following decade’s 
experience under it. They also discuss the evolution of the Bank of Canada’s policy thinking and practices over 
these years.  
 
3 Crow  (2002)  has written his own account of central banking in Canada, and discusses the evolution of inflation 
targeting between 1988 and 1993 in Ch. 8 of this book, pp. 183-200  
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There can be no doubt about this lecture’s intended significance. Its text is 
said to have gone through more than thirty drafts before delivery (See Laidler and 
Robson 1993, p. 89, fn.), and in his foreword to it, Professor Brian Scarfe of the 
University of Alberta’s economics department declared that “we believe that the 
governor’s “Edmonton Manifesto” is of equal significance to the “Saskatoon 
Manifesto” of his predecessor, Mr. Gerald Bouey, which launched the strategy of 
monetary gradualism in the Fall of 1975” (Scarfe 1988, p.1, see also Bouey 1975). 
The lecture’s fundamental message was also quite clear. Its second, (and first 
substantive) section bears the title “What To Do With Monetary Policy” [sic], and 
answers the query implicit here in its second paragraph, which reads in full: 
Theory and experience – much of this experience not overly cheerful but 
certainly instructive - both point to a very clear answer. Monetary policy 
should be conducted so as to achieve a pace of monetary expansion that 
promotes stability in the value of money. This means pursuing a policy 
aimed at achieving and maintaining stable prices (Crow 1988a, p. 4) 
This declaration cannot be read as announcing that inflation targeting as we 
nowadays know it was about to begin. Its reference to “monetary expansion” now 
looks archaic, a point to which we shall return later, but, more important, it also 
fails to quantify the notion of stable prices or to set a timetable for their attainment.  
The difference here from more recent practice is stark. The last (November 8th, 
2011) joint declaration about the future of monetary policy from the Canadian 
authorities runs as follows: 
The target will continue to be defined in terms of the 12-month rate of 
change in the total CPI. 
The inflation target will continue to be the 2 per cent mid-point of the 1 to 3 
per cent inflation-control-range. 
The agreement will run for another five-year period, ending 31 December 
2016.  (Government of Canada and Bank of Canada 2011) 
  The above-mentioned February1991 joint announcement of “targets for 
reducing inflation” (Bank of Canada 1991), in whose genesis the Department of 
Finance rather than the Bank seems to have taken the lead (See Crow (2002), Don 
Drummond 2010), brought the “zero inflation” program closer to the 2011 model 
by setting specific goals, within a target range, for the inflation rate, and proposing 
a time path for their attainment as well.4 Inflation, then running at more than 5 per 
                                                 
4 We now know, thanks to Crow (2002) and Drummond (2010), that the quantification of monetary policy’s goals 
was influenced by the then recent New Zealand example. We also know that the aims of the Bank of Canada and the 
Department of Finance were not the same. The Bank was intent on continuing its post-1988 drive towards price 
stability and was unenthusiastic about giving quantitative content to its goals. The Department of Finance, however, 
had more immediate short-run concerns. First, as we shall discuss below, late 1990 saw intense pressure on the 
exchange rate driven by uncertainty in financial markets about the durability of Canada’s commitment to inflation 
reduction, and the Department believed that the announcement of explicit quantitative goals would help stabilize the 
5 
 
cent, was to be gradually reduced to 3 per cent by the end of 1992, to 2 ½ per cent 
by the middle of 1994, and 2 per cent by the end of 1995, all of these plus or minus 
1 percentage point.  
But something else was very much present in both the Hanson Lecture and 
the 1991 announcement which had gone completely missing by 2011, namely an 
explicit invocation of the concept of price stability. Having specified an inflation 
reduction timetable, the 1991 announcement went on as follows, picking up the 
Hanson Lecture’s theme: “Thereafter the objective would be further reductions in 
inflation until price stability is achieved”; and it then defined this state of affairs as 
a “rate of increase in the CPI that is clearly below 2 per cent”, with the important 
qualification that further precision was not then being offered “in the event that 
further evidence becomes available over the next few years” (Bank of Canada 
1991).  In short, in the program launched in January 1988 and clarified in March 
1991, what we are now used to calling inflation targets were an intermediate means 
to attaining a more fundamental end, not a goal in and of themselves for Canada’s 
future monetary policy regime.  
When loosely specifying “price stability” as involving an inflation rate of 
less than 2 per cent, the March 1991 announcement cited a recent study by Pierre 
Fortin (1990) of the accuracy of changes in the CPI as a measure of inflation; and 
other contributors to the symposium in which Fortin’s work appeared  (Lipsey, ed. 
1990) had also suggested that in practice, allowing for biases in that index, which 
seemed to overestimate inflation by about 0.5 percent, “zero inflation” would mean 
a rate of increase for it in the range of 0 – 2 percent. In 1991 this specification was 
thus uncontroversial as a definition. As a goal, however, it was already a matter of 
considerable debate.  
From the outset in 1988, the Bank’s aims had been much criticised by 
commentators who were nervous about the economy’s ability to withstand 
monetary contraction of the scale needed to get inflation down, even gradually, 
from the 4 – 5 percent range then prevailing to zero, and about the Bank’s ability to 
stabilize it thereafter, not to mention about the political tensions that any regional 
disparities in such policies’ impacts might create (see, e.g. Robert F. Lucas (1989), 
Thomas Courchene 1990a, 1990b). The fiscal situation also presented a problem: 
the Federal budget had been in chronic deficit since 1974, and the introduction of a 
contractionary monetary policy in the face of what looked likely to be continuing 
fiscal ease had obvious and unpalatable implications for the likely behaviour of 
interest rates. Such arguments found a wide and sympathetic audience, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
situation. Second, the GST, a Federal value added tax, to be introduced in early 1991, was universally expected to 
give a once and for all boost to consumer prices, and with trade unions promising to push for offsetting wage 
increases, the Department, though willing to have the initial boost accommodated by monetary policy, saw some 
advantage in announcing clearly that an ensuing wage-price spiral would not be tolerated.  
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temperature of an already extremely heated public discussion of the Bank of 
Canada’s “zero inflation” policy continued to rise uninterruptedly and rapidly after 
the announcement of formal targets.  
Governor Crow’s seven year term of office was to expire in early 1994.5 Co-
incidentally but crucially, an election in late 1993 would – in a widely expected 
result - bring to power a Liberal government with no stake in the policy regime he 
had initiated, but to which a Conservative government had committed itself in its 
1991 budget. Obviously both the Governor’s position and the regime were 
politically vulnerable; and in the face of clear opposition from the new Minister of 
Finance, Mr. Paul Martin Jr., Crow withdrew his candidacy for reappointment. He 
was replaced by his deputy Gordon Thiessen, who, unlike Crow, was able to 
acquiesce in the new Minister of Finance’s insistence that the goal of “further 
progress” after 1995, beyond 2 percent inflation and towards “price stability”,  be 
suspended (as the price for extending the 1995 2 percent target until 1998), 
pending more study.6   
The further progress in question has remained in suspension ever since, 
through four renewals of the initially interim 2 percent inflation target, the terms of 
four Governors of the Bank of Canada, six federal elections, one major change of 
governing party, not to mention a continuous sequence of debates, conferences, 
speeches, working papers, technical studies etc.. These facts raise a number of 
questions: Why was Governor Crow unwilling to accept any weakening of his 
price stability program in 1993?  What had made this always politically vulnerable 
program completely untenable by then? And what happened thereafter to solidify 
an expedient short-run compromise, which at the time seemed simply to push a 
hard decision a couple of years into the future, into an enduring goal for Canadian 
monetary policy?   
  
 
                                                 
5 The Bank of Canada Act gives sole authority over the conduct of monetary policy to the Governor,  subject to (a) a 
requirement that he consult regularly with the Minister of Finance and (b) a ministerial over-ride power, which has 
to be implemented in writing, in specific terms, and expeditiously  published, and which has never been utilised, 
because it is understood that this would trigger the Governor’s immediate resignation, and hence precipitate a 
financial crisis. The Governor, whose appointment is renewable, holds office for seven years subject to “good 
behaviour”; that is, he can only be dismissed for malfeasance. He is appointed by a committee of the Bank’s Board 
of Directors (political appointees with no monetary policy function) subject to the approval of the Cabinet, normally 
in the person of the Minister of Finance. In practice, therefore, a Minister’s influence over a Governor’s policy 
stance is at its maximum if and when he comes up for re-appointment, because he can then threaten to withhold 
approval of a recommendation for re-appointment by the Board. Crow (2002, ch2.) deals with  the rules under which 
the Bank operates, and their evolution in some detail .See also Laidler and Robson (1993, Ch 3, and 2004, ch.2) 
 
6 The Board that initially recommended Crow’s re-appointment, and then seems to have insisted on that of Thiessen, 
was made up of appointees of the just defeated Conservative government. This fact may be significant in explaining 
how so much of the earlier monetary policy regime came to survive the 1993 change of government. 
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Price Stability as a Place to Stand 
The 1988 Hanson lecture was an important landmark in the evolution of Canadian 
monetary policy.7 Though Canada had re-adopted a flexible exchange rate in 1970 
to ease the domestic monetary impacts of rising balance of payments surpluses, 
policy makers had then made the mistake of resisting the currency’s subsequent 
appreciation and therefore ensured that the country would participate fully in the 
great international inflation of the subsequent years. A policy of gradually 
restricting narrow money (M1) growth, adopted in 1975 with considerable fanfare 
– and a public endorsement from Milton Friedman (See Thomas Courchene 
(1976), p. 111) - accomplished little, and by 1980 inflation still hovered around the 
10-11 per cent mark. Money growth targeting was already clearly on the verge of 
being discarded in Canada when the Volcker disinflation began in the United 
States, and the behaviour of the exchange rate, this time a rapid depreciation, again 
came to dominate policy as it had a decade earlier: interest rates were dramatically 
increased, with the bank rate rising to slightly above 21 percent, and the exchange 
rate was steadied; but the targeted narrow money supply collapsed and so did the 
real economy and the inflation rate.  
By the time the Bank’s de facto abandonment of monetary gradualism in 
order to support the exchange rate was explicitly ratified in1982, the real economy 
was beginning to recover, and inflation would settled down in the 4-5 per cent 
range for the next few years. Crucially, however, nothing replaced narrow money 
growth targeting as the centrepiece of monetary policy. To invoke the title of 
Governor Gerald Bouey’s Per Jacobsson Lecture of that year (Bouey 1982), its 
abandonment left monetary policy without  “A Place to Stand” for the next six 
years, as the Bank’s researchers undertook a vain search for a reliable replacement. 
They were not the only ones, and in the mid-1980s, there was a flurry of interest 
among academics and others in proposals to replace targets for money growth 
altogether with targets for the growth path of nominal GDP. Alongside an array of 
alternative monetary aggregates to M1, this was also among the possibilities 
investigated in Bank research. 8 But Bouey had already clearly hinted where the 
Bank’s own search might end in the final sentences of his 1982 lecture:  
Since it has proven so hard to halt the process, we now know for certain that 
we should not give inflation a place to start. Economic performance over 
                                                 
7 The story of monetary policy in the 1970s and 1980s, so briefly summarised here is told in more detail by Crow 
(2002, ch 7), and is dealt with extensively by Courchene (1976, 1977, 1978 and 1981) and  Peter Howitt (1986). See 
also, Laidler and Robson (1993, ch. 6.)  
8 The important Macdonald Commission Report on The Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada 
(see Royal Commission 1985) proposed such a goal as a medium term anchor for monetary policy.  For Bank of 
Canada research on this topic , see David Longworth and Stephen Poloz (1986), and Pierre Duguay and Longworth 
(1998).. I am indebted to David Longworth for helpful discussion of this episode.   
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time will be better if monetary policy never loses sight of the goal of 
maintaining the value of money” (p. 17)  
Thereafter, the Bank’s quest for a firm basis for a new regime slowly shifted 
away from seeking a more reliable intermediate target than M1 had proved to be, 
towards monetary policy’s ultimate target, the behaviour of the price level. In 
retrospect, there was something of a reversion here to ideas canvassed in the 
interwar years, when Irving Fisher and his Stable Money League promoted price 
stability as a legislated policy goal for the Fed. (See Fisher and Cohrssen 1934 for 
a retrospective account), and Henry Simons (1936) argued for making it the basis 
of a monetary policy based on “rules” rather than “authorities”. Such ideas had 
been pushed into the background when, under the influence of the Great 
Depression and the Keynesian Revolution, interest in monetary policy waned. 
They had then been kept there, even after this interest revived, by Milton 
Friedman’s powerful arguments (e.g. Friedman 1960) that lags in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary impulses made the direct pursuit of goals for the price 
level futile or even dangerously destabilising, and that a growth-rate rule for the 
money supply, a key intermediate variable, was a therefore a preferable basis for 
policy.9  It was from these ideas of Friedman’s that the policy regime abandoned in 
1982 had been somewhat loosely derived.     
If Governor Crow’s 1988 unequivocal declaration in favour of price stability 
did not quite mark the start of a process of fundamental change in the Bank of 
Canada’s views on monetary policy, then, it nevertheless highlighted a critical and 
growing difference between those views and an important element of the period’s 
mainstream academic macroeconomics, including its Canadian branch. The 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve, still an important component of today’s 
“standard model” of inflation targeting, had arrived on this academic scene in the 
late 1960s in two separate, albeit complementary, packages. In one, dispatched by 
Friedman (1968), it was accompanied by the argument that all monetary policy 
could control was the long-run average inflation rate – by way of setting a steady 
pace of money growth - while unemployment would have to be left to settle at its 
“natural” level. In the other, launched by Edmund Phelps (1967, 1972), the 
relationship was touted as the key component of a new “cost-benefit approach to 
monetary planning” in which the old static Phillips curve trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment was reconfigured in dynamic terms, with the latter 
variable creating the main costs to be incurred while efforts to reduce the inflation 
rate were in progress.  
                                                 
9 George Tavlas (2015) gives a convincing account of the role played by the analysis of policy leads and lags, and 
their capacity for generating instability, not to mention a large body of empirical evidence testifying to their 
importance amassed by Friedman and his co-workers, in differentiating Friedman’s analysis of monetary policy 
rules from that of his Chicago predecessor Henry Simons.  
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In the 1970s, when the policy problem throughout the Western world 
seemed to be how to reduce inflation, Phelps’ formulation attracted much attention.  
In particular, when combined with the then fashionable habit of measuring the 
gains to be had from reducing inflation in terms the areas of welfare-triangles 
under the demand for money function, which turned out in practice to be rather 
small – shoe-leather costs as James Tobin (1972) contemptuously dismissed them 
– this approach raised the possibility of simply learning to live with an already 
deeply embedded inflation rate as a serious policy option. 
The idea that Canadian monetary policy should settle for stabilising the 
inflation rate at its then current value of a little over 4 percent was the clear target 
of Crow’s insistence in 1988 that  
“the notion of a high, yet stable, rate of inflation is simply unrealistic . . . If 
the authorities were unwilling to act to get the rate of inflation down from, 
for example 4 per cent, why should anyone believe they would be any more 
willing to get it back to 4 per cent if for one reason or another upward 
pressure on prices led the inflation rate to rise to 5 per cent? And so on”,  
Hence “the only realistic policy we can pursue that will generate and warrant 
confidence in the future value of money is to work towards price stability” (1988a 
p. 5).   
The idea that “creeping inflation”, if tolerated, would always threaten to 
evolve into “trotting inflation”, and perhaps ultimately to break into a “gallop” – 
here I borrow vocabulary used by one of its most distinguished earlier exponents, 
Gottfried von Haberler (1961) – and hence could not be a credible policy goal, was 
hardly new when Crow invoked it in 1988, though by then it had been 
academically unfashionable for twenty years or so. Indeed, Lipsey had dismissed it 
as a “very commonly believed piece of folklore” albeit without citing a source, as 
early as 1963, in the very first edition of his famous introductory textbook (See 
Lipsey 1963, p. 430). But this is hardly the first time that an old idea has resurfaced 
and become influential in the history of macroeconomics, and this one did both, at 
a crucial moment in the history of Canadian monetary policy. As we have just 
seen, it was the main basis for Crow’s commitment to price stability as a place for 
monetary policy to stand in 1988 and it also underpinned his unwillingness to cede 
this long-run commitment to what he saw as short-run political expediency in 
1993.   
But this same idea made little impact among Canadian macroeconomists 
when Crow resurrected it. Scepticism about it figured prominently not only among 
his critics, but also among those more inclined to support him. Among the latter, 
though Richard Lipsey (1990) stressed the considerable capacity of even an 
apparently “low” inflation rate of 4 per cent to erode nominal wealth and fixed 
money incomes, he also discussed the Bank’s proposed policies in terms of a 
10 
 
dynamic trade-off between its immediate costs and longer term benefits, as did 
Douglas Purvis (1990) and Peter Howitt (1990). Purvis (1990) accepted Crow’s 
argument that inflation in the 4-5 per cent range was too high to be credible, and 
agreed that the Bank should gradually reduce it from this level, but he saw no 
reason for this reduction to be carried all the way to zero. Like the Bank, he 
believed that the credibility of a commitment to stable inflation would increase as 
it fell, but unlike the Bank, he suggested that the question of whether inflation 
reduction could safely stop short of price stability could be left open for a while.  
Howitt analysed the Canadian situation in explicitly Phelpsian terms and 
assessed the costs of inflation, not in terms of triangles under a demand for money 
function, but of the more pervasive distortions that menu-cost related fluctuations 
in relative prices, whose effects were amplified by a largely unindexed tax system, 
could generate as inflation progressed. And he supplemented his treatment along 
these lines - ones that Courchene (1981), citing, as did Howitt, Axel Leijonhufvud 
(1977), had introduced into the Canadian debate a decade earlier - with a relatively 
new twist. Referring to recent developments in endogenous growth theory (see 
Howitt p.99, fn), he suggested that, because investment was the means whereby 
new productivity-enhancing technology was brought into use, and because higher 
inflation undermined the efficiency of this activity, reducing it was likely to raise 
not just the level of output (a claim that had been made in the Hanson lecture) but 
its rate of growth as well. Given the capacity of even small increases in the rate of 
growth of an income stream to increase its present value, this argument tipped the 
verdict of Howitt’s analysis, which attracted much attention in the next few years, 
very much in favour of moving from the status quo 5 percent inflation of 1990 
towards a significantly lower rate; but still, and in agreement with Purvis, he 
explicitly pointed out that, because the marginal benefits of reducing inflation 
would decrease as it fell, while the marginal costs were likely to remain constant,  
it stopped short of establishing the total elimination of inflation as the only 
reasonable long run goal for monetary policy. 10  
The important point here is that such Phelpsian analysis did not imply that 
deep economic principles were being violated when, in 1993, a new Minister of 
                                                 
10 Unusually for a Canadian policy study, Howitt’s work attracted attention within the Federal Reserve System (see. 
Daniel Thornton 1996). It cited a well-known Bank of Canada study by Peter Jarrett and Jack Selody (1982) of the 
inter-relationships between inflation and productivity growth in the 1960s and 1970s that seemed to suggest that the 
gains to be realised here were significant. The Bank’s own continuing interest in this theme is epitomised by Selody 
(1990). In hindsight it seems likely that these results, which did not prove robust, were heavily affected by the fact 
that a significant secular slowdown in productivity growth in the mid-1970s coincided with the arrival of double 
digit inflation. A later study of international evidence on this issue by Robert J. Barro (1996) carried out for the 
Bank of England found that such relationships became harder to discern as inflation rates sank into the single digit 
range. For a well-balanced retrospective account of the rise and fall of Canadian economists’ confidence in the 
productivity and productivity growth gains to be realised from low inflation, written against the background of 
Canada’s policy regime, see Christopher Ragan (1998). See also, Laidler and Robson (2004, pp. 150-155)  
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Finance refused to support more ambitious post-1995 goals for price stability. 
While Crow’s view of matters in 1993 focussed on the loss of what he regarded as 
the essential element of his monetary policy program, the majority of his 
supporters focussed instead on the fact that a 2 percent inflation target to be 
reached over the next couple of years was still in place. They were relieved that 
what they had always regarded as important about his program, its inflation 
reduction element, had been preserved in the face of considerable criticism and 
political opposition. 
 
The Exchange Rate and the Contraction of 1990-91 
At the turn of 1993-94, when all this happened, the Canadian economy was well 
into the second year of what would prove to be an agonisingly slow recovery from 
a recession that had struck suddenly in late 1990 and (unlike the mild US 
contraction of that year) had been almost as deep as that of 1981 – with a peak 
unemployment rate of a little over 11 per cent. This event, and in particular its 
severity, was widely and immediately attributed to monetary policy, so explicit 
inflation-reduction-price-stability targets, set in its midst with the endorsement of 
the government of the day, were bound to suffer politically by association when a 
new government came to power.  In fact, however, the monetary contraction 
responsible for the recession’s severity began well before explicit targets were put 
in place, and stemmed not so much from an obsessive over-eagerness on the part of 
the Bank of Canada to get moving along the road to price stability, as many of its 
critics suggested, as from a desire to protect its own and its program’s credibility 
against what it perceived to be a threat from foreign exchange markets. Here the 
main influences on the Bank’s actions were not so much ideas about the virtues of 
price stability per se, but about the role of the exchange rate in the monetary policy 
process. 
After the Hanson lecture, and further remarks delivered by Crow at the 1988 
meetings of the Canadian Economics Association (Crow 1988b) that confirmed 
that this lecture was indeed to be taken seriously, monetary tightening had 
tentatively begun in the second half of the year, and by 1989 had become firm 
enough to attract both public attention and criticism, as both interest rates and the 
exchange rate moved up. By late 1989, however, demand pressures in the economy 
showed signs of slackening, at least to careful observers such as Governor Crow 
and his colleagues: a little monetary easing seemed to be called for, and was duly 
applied.11 
Unfortunately, this easing, extremely moderate though it was, was widely 
read in financial markets not as an indication that policy was on track, but that the 
                                                 
11 This episode is described in more detail by Laidler and Robson (1993, Ch. 7) 
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Governor’s resolution to see his price stability program through was weakening. 
The exchange rate fell by two cents in a week and a further two within the month. 
The Bank responded not just by reversing its monetary easing but by tightening 
policy significantly relative to where it had been over the previous year. It held this 
new stance well into 1990, with bank rate peaking at just over 14 per cent in May, 
even as the exchange rate stabilised and then moved up, and the narrow money 
supply collapsed just as it had in 1981. The resulting slump, already visible when 
inflation control targets were announced in February 1991, would reach its trough 
in the second quarter of that year, and by the beginning of 1992, inflation that had 
been running at 5- 6 percent a year earlier, came in at just under 2 percent, the 
figure targeted for the end of 1995.12 
It is hard to deny that Bank of Canada policies were the proximate cause of 
most of this, or that in redirecting policy towards the short-term behaviour of the 
exchange rate in 1990, the Bank undermined its own longer-term strategy. But 
there was nothing improvised about the measures it took. They were clearly 
foreshadowed in the Hanson Lecture, which had paid careful attention to the place 
of the exchange rate in the determination of the price level and more generally in 
the mechanisms through which monetary policy affected the economy. Reflecting 
on the situation that had prevailed in the mid-1980s, Crow had remarked that 
the main risk on the inflation front was from price shocks caused by 
exchange rate movements. These shocks might have led to a resurgence of 
inflationary expectations and greater upward pressure on prices . . .the 
avoidance of sharp depreciations of the exchange rate therefore received a 
good deal of weight in monetary policy decisions (Crow 1988a, p. 20) 
And then, turning to the future, he had assured his audience that 
we have to take account of movements in our exchange rate on the pace of 
spending and of inflation in our economy. This is so even if our goal is not 
the external value but rather the domestic value of the Canadian dollar, and 
even if the surest way to sustain the exchange value of our currency is to 
maintain its purchasing power at home. . . . let me underline that monetary 
policy will always to be ready to act, and act promptly, to backstop 
confidence in the Canadian dollar. Such confidence, once dissipated, is not 
easily regained. (Crow 1988a, pp.23-24) 
                                                 
12 CPI Inflation data for 1991-2 are distorted by the introduction of the GST at the beginning of 1991. The measured 
year on year rate in the month the tax was introduced was a little over 6 per cent, with a percentage point of this 
probably being attributable to the tax. When its effects dropped out of the index 12 months later, the rate came in at 




At the beginning of 1990, judging  that confidence in the currency was indeed 
weakening fast, and threatening to set in motion a vicious circle of depreciation 
and domestic inflation, this is exactly what the Bank of Canada did  
We do not need to reach a verdict here on whether the Bank of Canada had 
any option but to react as it did in 1990 (though some supporters of its overall 
program thought at the time that a more measured reaction would have been both 
feasible and desirable: see, e.g. Laidler and Robson 1993, p 104). There were 
several good reasons, completely unrelated to monetary policy, for confidence in 
the currency be to particularly weak at that time.13 And in 1990, it was not even 
clear that the Bank of Canada’s price stability program had the support of the 
government of the day. As one of Crow’s more perceptive critics (David Johnson 
1990) had noted, the inflation forecasts embedded in the 1990 budget lay 
significantly above any time path that was consistent with the Bank’s declared 
intentions. 
What is important here is that there was nothing novel about the fears that 
drove the reaction in question. Similar concerns had underlain the Bank’s setting 
aside its gradualist policies in order to support the exchange rate in 1981 (see, 
Bouey 1982 pp. 13-14), and the idea that speculation-driven exchange rate 
depreciation could be an essentially independent driver of domestic inflation had 
an even longer pedigree. Sixty years or so earlier, a version of just such a 
mechanism had been widely touted as an explanation of the Weimar hyper-
inflation (see Laidler and George Stadler 1998 pp. 142-144); and this analysis was 
also closely related to notions about the dangers of destabilizing speculation that 
had figured prominently in the League of Nations sponsored study of inter-war 
exchange rate instability by Ragnar Nurkse (1944). This study had, of course, 
drawn criticism from Milton Friedman (1953), who had argued that the observed 
exchange rate instability of the inter-war years was the side effect of unstable 
domestic monetary policies, inconsistent across countries, rather than the product 
of an inherent flaw in the workings of the foreign exchange market itself. Thus, 
and as is usually the case, the well-established ideas that motivated Canadian 
monetary policy in 1989-91 were not the only ones available. 14  
                                                 
13 Among these reasons were the following: the 1987 Meech Lake Accord –a  federal-provincial agreement on 
fundamental constitutional reform - was clearly in trouble by 1989, and in fact failed to be ratified in 1990, setting in 
train a more or less continuous series of internal political shocks that would culminate in the 1995 Quebec 
referendum on separation, which came within a hairsbreadth of breaking up the country;  the Federal  budget 
remained in chronic deficit, and the higher interest rates associated with the Bank’s policies were putting it under 
increasing strain, even before the defence of the exchange rate made these intense; the next election looked 
increasingly likely to bring to power a new Liberal government pledged to abolish the newly introduced  GST and to 
renegotiate the North American Free Trade agreement, but whose leaders had said nothing about how they intended 
to replace these newly erected pillars of Canadian fiscal and trade policy. 
14 It should be recalled though, that in the wake of the two decades of gyrating exchange rates that followed the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, confidence in the stability of the foreign exchange market was at a low 
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The Natural Unemployment Rate Hypothesis  
The foregoing story about the role of ideas in bringing about Canada’s 1990-91 
recession is very unlike that told by George Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009). 
These authors also lay the proximate blame for events squarely on restrictive 
monetary policy, but they differ in their assessment of the economic theory that 
drove its conduct. Here, following Fortin (1996), they assign pride of place to the 
natural unemployment rate hypothesis. In their words, “Crow was a firm believer 
in natural rate theory and the ability of the central bank to bring inflation down. 
And he was successful in this task . . . but at a terrible cost” (p.114). They then go 
on to blame a Canadian slump that they suggest lasted till the end of the decade – a 
stretched interpretation of the evidence, particularly that generated after 1995 - on 
the continued pursuit of low inflation after 1994 by Crow’s successor Gordon 
Thiessen, which they allege was also underpinned by an “ideological” belief in the 
natural rate hypothesis.15    
As already noted above, the idea that there is no long-run inflation 
unemployment trade off was a highly visible feature of Friedman’s (1968) 
exposition of the expectations augmented Phillips curve. From the outset, this idea 
was controversial and open to plausible criticism from two standpoints in 
particular. First, an idea advanced by James Tobin (1972), money wage setting 
processes might be subject to extra rigidities in the region of zero change that 
would make it particularly difficult for wage relativities to adjust to variations in 
the structure of the demand for labour at low inflation rates. If this was the case, 
then there would still be a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
at those lower inflation rates. Second, the labour market might be subject to what 
Phelps (1972) termed “hysteresis”, whereby the time path followed by 
unemployment as inflation was being reduced might bring about changes in the 
labour market’s structure that would then influence the sustainable long run rate of 
unemployment once this process was complete.    
Such effects as these are indeed logical possibilities, as Laidler and Robson 
(2004, pp. 149-50) noted, but what really mattered in the 1990s, as now, is their 
quantitative significance. The first of them did not attract a great deal of attention 
in the high-inflation 1970s for obvious reasons, but the second was readily and 
quickly incorporated into the Phelpsian approach to monetary planning discussed 
above as an extra and potentially complicating factor. By the late 1980s, however, 
both were potentially relevant to the design of a monetary policy intended to 
                                                                                                                                                             
ebb at the beginning of the 1990s. Whether this experience, which to the best of my recollection, none of the 
supporters of flexible rates had anticipated or found themselves able to explain at the time, can actually be explained 
in terms of inconsistencies among the then current and prospective policies of the countries involved is a question 
that I would prefer not to tackle here.  
15 Akerlof and Shiller do not cite Crow (2002) in the course of their attack on his policies. 
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eliminate inflation altogether, but, to judge from the Hanson Lecture, they do not 
seem to have attracted the Bank of Canada’s attention, though the possibility of 
hysteresis effects did feature in some of the supportive academic discussions of the 
Bank’s program already cited (See e.g. Howitt, 1990, Laidler, 1990). On the other 
hand, however, The Bank of Canada made no explicit declaration of faith in the 
natural rate hypothesis either, to match that of, say, Purvis (1990 pp. 37-38), who 
did however qualify it with an explicit warning that it might take five years or 
more for “temporary effects” to dissipate after a monetary contraction.  
In the Hanson lecture and elsewhere, Crow certainly argued that there were 
no gains to be had for the economy in taking a permanently relaxed attitude to 
inflation, and maybe some losses to be incurred too. It is doubtful, however, that 
the main inspiration here was Friedman (1968); if it had been, Crow would hardly 
have also argued that any inflation rate high enough to be perceived by the public 
at large would lack credibility and hence be unstable, a conclusion quite contrary 
to Friedman’s broader message. It is far more likely that he was building on 
intellectual examples of scepticism about any alleged benefits of inflation set, 
among others, by an earlier Governor of the Bank, James Coyne, whose career had 
foundered in 1960, in part on his commitment to this idea, and by the members of 
the Porter Commission (see Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, 1964) 
which had reported comprehensively on the workings of the Canadian monetary 
system in the wake of the crisis that had followed Coyne’s resignation, and whose 
discussions of this issue Crow’s deputy and eventual successor Gordon Thiessen 
would later term “prescient” (see, Thiessen 1999, p.47).16   
Had policy followed its initially intended gradual path after 1988, none of 
this might have mattered very much, but its sudden tightening in 1990 and the 
recession that followed changed the landscape entirely. Not only did the prospect 
of hysteresis effects like those seemingly been observed in the 1980s become a 
serious and alarming possibility for a while, as Fortin (1991) was quick to point 
out, but with inflation falling to a range not observed since the 1960s, so did 
adverse wage-stickiness effects on the long run level of unemployment. A working 
paper on the latter topic, again by Fortin (1995), was in circulation some time in 
that year, though his results were not actually published under his own authorship 
until the following November, forming, as they did one important component of 
the altogether broader attack on Bank of Canada policy that he launched in his 
May 1966 Presidential address to the Canadian Economics Association (See Fortin 
1996).  
                                                 
16 Crow (2002 , chs. 1 and 2) discusses these episodes and their implications. James Powell (2009) gives a fuller 
account of the so called “Coyne Affair”. On the Porter Commission more generally, also see Thiessen (1999) 
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By then, these results had already attracted international attention, having 
been a prime exhibit in Akerlof, Dickens and Perry’s (1996) still well known, and 
successful, attempt to revive interest in Tobin’s (1972) critique of the natural 
unemployment rate hypothesis, and having also been cited by Paul Krugman 
(1996) in an essay entitled “Stable Prices and Fast Growth, Just Say No” written 
for The Economist; and Fortin (1995 and 1996) are still the only sources cited in by 
Akerlof and Shiller’s (2009) in their account of the role played by the natural 
unemployment rate idea in shaping Canadian economic policy and history in the 
1990s.  Hence, the nature and robustness of Fortin’s results are of some interest.  
To summarise: Fortin found that a much larger fraction – Krugman termed it 
a “staggering 47 percent” -  of union wage bargains that did not include cost of 
living adjustment clauses had settled on no change in money wages during the low 
inflation years of 1992-94 than during the higher inflation years of 1986-88  - 
around 12 percent. Applying Tobin’s (1972) analysis, and referring back to his 
own earlier working paper and to Akerlof, Dickens and Perry’s (1996) by then 
published discussion of these matters, Fortin argued that these results implied the 
existence of a significant negative relationship between inflation and the long-run 
unemployment rate in Canada at inflation rates below 3 percent. Hence, he 
concluded,  not only had monetary policy been responsible for the 1990-91 
downturn, but a continuing policy aimed at a 2 percent inflation rate was 
condemning the country to continuing high unemployment and poor economic 
performance into the foreseeable future. 
Readers of Akerlof and Shiller (2009) are left with the impression that this is 
where matters still rest, and that Fortin’s gloomy forecasts were vindicated by 
subsequent experience, but in fact Fortin’s results were quickly challenged as 
being heavily dependent on particular and controversial decisions about just how to 
select and organise the relevant data (See, for example, Seamus Hogan (1997), 
Allan Crawford and Alan Harrison (1998), and Charles Freedman and Tiff 
Macklem 1998). When alternative, and arguably more plausible, formulations were 
deployed, Fortin’s “staggering” 47 per cent figure for zero wage changes in 
contracts negotiated in 1992-94 fell well below 20 per cent.17 These data 
adjustments were also more than adequate to shift the inflation rate at which Tobin 
style effects on the long inflation-unemployment rate-off became important to less 
than 2 percent, which perhaps helps to explain why Canadian unemployment fell 
from above 9 percent in 1996 to the 7 percent range by the end of the decade, a 
                                                 
17 Though Tobin’s initial analysis was cast in terms of the behaviour of private sector labour markets, Fortin’s data 
set included many public sector agreements, including some from the province of Ontario in the 1992-94 period in 
which wage freezes had not emerged from any bargaining process, but had been imposed by government decree. 
Only the first year outcomes of multi-year contracts were counted, even where the first year in question involved 
grandfathering what had already happened because of bargaining delays and produced an automatic “no-change” 
observation, and even where wage increases or cuts for later years formed part of the overall bargain. 
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range not experienced since the early 1970s, and even lower thereafter (6 percent 
in 2007,  just before the Great Recession), despite an inflation rate of around 2 
percent being sustained.  
Even so, after these adjustments, the data still revealed an unusual bunching 
of wage settlements around zero, and hence gave some qualitative support to 
concerns about how the labour market would perform at an inflation rate below 2 
percent. Crucially, then, they also left open some residual questions about the 
wisdom of shifting monetary policy towards a more ambitious inflation goal than 
the interim 2 percent target, particularly in the light of the fact that the productivity 
and productivity growth gains that had been widely expected from reducing 
inflation from the 5 to the 2 percent range, and which had underpinned Howitt’s 
(1990) endorsement of this goal, simply had not materialised, so that no gains on 
this front could confidently be expected from any further reduction.  
 
The Exchange Rate and Monetary Conditions 
The three most significant post-war episodes of monetary instability in Canada – 
the onset of inflation after 1970, and the two slumps of 1981-2 and 1990-91 were 
all, or so it has been argued here, heavily influenced by the Bank of Canada’s 
becoming distracted from its domestic goals by the behaviour of the exchange rate. 
Nor, despite this experience, was the Bank quite immune to such temptations later 
in the 1990s.18 Fears of exchange rate depreciation that might generate 
extrapolative expectations and lead on to a vicious circle of inflation and further 
depreciation were still aired in speeches by the Governor, notably for example in 
Thiessen (1995), while the Tequila crisis of early 1995 and the Russian crisis of 
1998 both brought the Canadian dollar under external pressure, and drew responses 
from the Bank in the form of domestic monetary tightening.  
Compared to earlier episodes, however, these responses, particularly in the 
second instance, were relatively short-lived. Perhaps this was because some of the 
non-monetary factors that had contributed to the fragility of confidence in the 
Canadian economy in 1990-91 were already beginning to become less significant 
by the middle of the decade, though this did not prevent the Canadian dollar 
attracting in some quarters the nickname “Hudson Bay Peso” for a while.19 But 
perhaps also, the Bank had learned some lessons from those earlier episodes about 
                                                 
18 Laidler and Robson, (2004, pp.155-173) give a more detailed account than space permits here of the exchange 
rate’s behaviour as well as its influence on policy debates and policy itself during this period. 
19 By 1995 inflation targets had been in place for four years and, with their credibility growing, looked to be headed 
towards eventual renewal, while the Liberal government had quietly dropped its plans for abolishing the GST and 
renegotiating the NAFTA.  Crucially also, after a shaky start in 1994, serious and visible political efforts to come to 
grips with the fiscal situation culminated in the landmark  “austerity” - as it would nowadays be labelled - budget of 
February 1995. The question of Quebec separation was settled, for a while, in October 1995 by a referendum in that 
province, though by an extremely slim margin.. 
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the dangers of letting the short-run behaviour of the exchange rate distract attention 
from its longer-term domestic goals.  
The exchange rate had been discussed not just as a potential source of 
exogenous monetary disturbance in the Hanson lecture, however, but also as a key 
variable in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The lecture’s account of 
this mechanism amounted to an embryonic version of an open economy variation 
on that embodied in today’s standard model, and in this context, the exchange rate 
continued to feature prominently not only in the Bank of Canada’s conduct of 
policy, but also in its efforts to communicate its policy intentions to the public at 
large, well into the later 1990s. Indeed, beginning around 1990, (See Charles 
Freedman 1994) the Bank pioneered first the construction and then the publication 
of a “Monetary Conditions Index” (MCI) in which estimates of the relative 
importance of interest rate and exchange rate movements for aggregate demand 
were quantified and blended into a single number.20 For a while this index became 
an informal but apparently important intermediate target for monetary policy. It 
played the same role as that of some representative market interest rate, or rates, in 
the closed economy systems of the time that were by then coming more and more 
to resemble today’s standard models, and which Bank researchers, building on 
their own contributions to these developments, were adapting to local requirements 
(See, e.g. Pierre Duguay 1994, and Don Coletti et al. 1996, whose work was 
already in progress in 1994).21  
The target value of the MCI was thus never intended to be a constant, as 
Bank of Canada communications repeated ad nauseam in the mid-1990s.  In the 
Bank’s approach, policy actions were geared to adjusting the MCI to the state of 
aggregate demand and inflation expectations, so as to keep actual inflation on 
track; and clear communications to the public at large about its intentions here 
were intended to facilitate the economy’s adjustment to those actions, in an early 
version of the use of “forward guidance” in the policy process, though this specific 
terminology was, of course, not then current.   
The underlying theory here was surely faultless, but the MCI foundered in 
practice on a complicating factor whose significance even sophisticated private 
sector agents turned out to find hard to grasp (despite the Bank’s repeated efforts to 
explain its significance): namely, that, in the very nature of things, the exchange 
rate was subject to more than one influence, and how an inflation targeting central 
bank should adapt interest rates to movements in this variable in order to keep the 
MCI and therefore inflation on track, depended on which of these was at work. A 
                                                 
20 What they term “The rise and fall of the monetary conditions index” is discussed in more detail by Laidler and 
Robson (2004, pp 119-123) 
21 And see also Duguay and Longworth (1998) for a retrospective account of Bank of Canada contributions to these 
developments, which dated back to the mid-1980s 
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tendency of the exchange rate to respond to financial market troubles elsewhere in 
the world – as when, for example, the Tequila crisis caused an international flight 
to the quality of the US dollar, weakening the Canadian exchange rate as a side 
effect – would, other things equal require an offsetting change in Canadian interest 
rates to maintain monetary conditions constant. On the other hand, if the exchange 
rate movement was the result of changing demand conditions for Canadian 
exports, the appropriate response, again other things equal, would be to allow the 
resulting change in monetary conditions to offset this real shock, and hence not to 
respond to the exchange rate change with an interest rate movement.  
Apparently unable to grasp this all important distinction (and, to be fair, 
even when it is grasped in principle, it can be hard to apply in practice) agents 
began to anticipate mechanically in domestic financial markets what they believed 
the Bank’s response to any change in the exchange rate was going to be if the MCI 
was to remain stable. They also began to complain about having been misled on 
occasions when the Bank disappointed them. The MCI, that is to say, rather than 
aiding the transparency with which monetary policy was conducted, actually 
became a source of opacity that hampered its effectiveness. After a particularly 
difficult episode involving dissonance among the Bank’s initial conditional 
intentions towards, market expectations about, and the actual evolution of, 
monetary conditions after the spring of 1998, created by the unexpected onset of 
the Russian crisis in the summer, the Bank began to downplay the MCI, and in due 
course ceased its publication. As deputy governor Charles Freedman (2001) 
remarked: 
While in my view monetary conditions remain a useful concept, the MCI has 
not proved to be especially helpful as a communications device vis-à-vis 
markets at times of uncertainty regarding the source of the shock causing the 
movement in the exchange rate. Thus, while the Bank continues to use the 
term “monetary conditions” in its description of policy, it places less 
emphasis on the MCI as a measure of these conditions. (p. 4)  
Also in 1998, in decisions associated with the above-mentioned Russian 
crisis, the Bank of Canada permanently suspended what, up till then, had been a 
routine policy of regular “symmetrical intervention” in the foreign exchange 
market, while that summer also saw what has proved to be its last attempt to 
stabilise this market by way of a special intervention (though the Bank still 
reserves it right to carry out such intervention in unspecified circumstances).22 All 
                                                 
22 “Symmetric intervention” involved the Bank in automatically buying its currency on a falling market and selling it 
on a rising market, not in order to influence the ultimate outcome, but to smooth the exchange rate’s progress 
towards it. During the Russian crisis of the summer of 1998, foreign exchange rates were so volatile that, although 
the general direction of the exchange rate was downwards, it occasionally rallied for a few days. At such times the 
Bank found itself selling the currency at the same prices at which it had been buying only a few days earlier, thus 
creating confusion in the market about what its intentions actually were.  
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in all, then, it is fair to say by the end of the 1990s, the exchange rate had finally 
been deprived of the privileged position that it had earlier occupied in monetary 
policy making in Canada. By then, the Bank seemed to have begun to follow the 
advice of a future Governor, then in the private sector, to “develop an indifference 
towards the currency” (Poloz, 1997, p. 238). Thereafter, for example, the Bank 
stood by when the exchange rate fell as low as 62 cents U.S. in 2003, a response 
that would have been unthinkable a decade earlier. 
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that beginning in 1998, certain 
commentators, some of whom had never been happy with inflation targeting in the 
first place because they had remained sceptical about the stability of the market 
determined flexible exchange rate that was by then widely understood to be 
necessary to support it, launched a vigorous campaign to have the regime scrapped 
in favour of some sort of fixed exchange rate arrangement – a Currency Board 
based on the US dollar, along Argentinian lines, was one suggestion, and the 
creation of a North American Monetary Union on the then brand new European 
model was another (See e.g. Courchene and Richard Harris 1999 and Herbert 
Grubel 1999).23  
Such proposals caused a considerable stir among the informed public, with 
some of their proponents (see e.g. Sherry Cooper 2001) going so far as to argue 
that spontaneous dollarization of the Canadian economy was already well under 
way and gathering speed, so that the formal and quick adoption by Canada of the 
US dollar as its domestic currency was the only viable monetary policy option left 
open. Bank of Canada researchers easily enough rebutted such allegations about 
the facts of the case (See John Murray and Powell 2002); and ultimately, as the 
exchange rate rebounded from its 2003 low – it reached a high of $1.07 for a day 
or so in 2006  - these schemes lost political traction.  
Meanwhile, in 2001 the “interim” 2 percent inflation target that had been 
inherited from the impasse of 1993, and had then been renewed in 1998, was 
renewed once more. Another renewal followed in 2006, accompanied by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
23 It is hard to resist the conclusion that there was an element of me-too-ism about the enthusiasm for such schemes. 
In the late 1990s the Argentinian currency board seemed to be stable and successful, having survived the tests posed 
for it by the Tequila crisis, and Europe was in the process of launching the Euro. And of course, the ups and downs 
of the Canadian dollar since the advent of inflation targeting had helped perpetuate in some circles the very 
legitimate doubts about flexible exchange rate stability that the experience of the 1970s and 80s had created. An 
important element in the case against such fears was Bank of Canada Research (Robert Amano and Simon van 
Norden 1995) arguing that these variations largely reflected terms of trade effects, particularly those emanating from 
international commodity markets in general, and that for oil in particular, which played an independent role in what 
came to be called “the Bank of Canada” equation. This work proved not only to be replicable, but also to generate 
results that continued to hold as new data emerged. In particular, the oil price which had taken a positive coefficient 
for earlier years, when Canada was a net importer, switched signs, as it should have done, when Canada became a 
net oil exporter.  For a further discussion, see Laidler and Robson  (2004, pp. 164-167) 
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promise that a systematic review of other options would be undertaken prior to 
2011. 
 
The Marginalisation of the Monetary Aggregates 
As noted earlier, between 1975 and 1982, the Bank of Canada had tried and largely 
failed to bring inflation under control by gradually reducing the rate of growth of a 
narrow monetary aggregate. The reasons for this disappointment are nowadays not 
controversial (see e.g. Howitt 2001, 2012)), and were already being perceptively 
documented by Couchene (e.g. 1977, 1981) while the program was still in place.  
To begin with, the policy was introduced so gradually that it failed to 
generate any immediately obvious effects that might have helped it gain 
credibility.  In addition, the economic significance of the particular aggregate, the 
rather narrow M1, being targeted kept changing. This was partly in response to the 
development of new computing technology that affected the types of chequable 
deposits that banks could economically offer their customers, partly to the 
incentives to adopt such innovations that high nominal interest rates generated by 
inflation were creating, and partly to the very existence of the M1 targeting 
program itself, a manifestation of what would later come to be called the “Lucas 
critique” and/or “Goodhart’s law”, but which Courchene (1977) called “the 
Heisenberg principle” citing Kenneth Boulding (1966) as the idea’s originator.  
Also central to Courchene’s critique was his skepticism about the Bank’s 
decision to implement its program by relying on the sensitivity of the demand for 
money to the same short term interest rates that already served - and would 
continue to serve right down to the present - as its immediate policy targets, and 
thus to treat money growth as if it were a passively endogenous demand-driven 
indicator of monetary policy’s stance. Between 1975 and 1982, all the action in the 
Bank’s vision of the transmission mechanism underlying its monetary gradualism 
came from the effects on aggregate demand of the changes in interest rates (or, 
more broadly, monetary conditions) that seemed to be needed to keep this indicator 
on track. Money itself had no causative role in the Bank’s conception of these 
matters.  
This interpretation of the place of the monetary aggregates in the policy 
process foreshadowed, in most of its essentials, the role (or rather lack thereof) 
accorded to them in today’s standard model, and, following Woodford (2003), is 
nowadays widely understood to imply that policy makers may safely ignore the 
monetary aggregates altogether, even as indicators. Such a view provides the 
theoretical basis for their virtual disappearance from today’s mainstream policy 
discussions (see Freedman (2003), Howitt 2012). This last implication was not 
fully grasped, let alone accepted, in the 1980s and early ‘90s, however, but later in 
the decade it did explicitly feature in the Bank’s explanation of why the aggregates 
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were omitted from the formal structure of its then new Quarterly Projection Model 
(see Coletti et al., 1996,  p.123), a system which subsequently evolved into today’s 
Terms-of-Trade Economic Model, (ToTEM).    
Be that as it may, when it came to the transmission mechanism, the Hanson 
lecture was following  already well-established Bank of Canada practice in 
pointedly ignoring money, except for a single passing assertion that 
“disequilibrium between the supply and demand for money” (along with “non-
price rationing” and “some mysterious ‘black box’”) had no role to play. Instead, it 
described the  
linkages between central bank actions and their ultimate effects on the 
economy . . . as follows. The Bank of Canada, by increasing or decreasing 
the supply of settlement balances to financial institutions, directly influences 
the very shortest term interest rates in the Canadian money market. 
Movements in these rates in turn influence the whole spectrum of market 
and administered interest rates and rates of return on a wide variety of assets 
and liabilities and, through them, the exchange value of the Canadian dollar. 
The movements of various rates of return and the price of foreign exchange 
affect over time total spending in the economy.”  (Crow 1988a, p.9)  
Although this analysis is essentially the same (though less formally expressed) as 
that appearing in open economy versions of today’s standard model, when it came 
to what it called “The Use of Policy Guides” the Hanson lecture extensively 
discussed work then in progress at the Bank on the stability of various empirical 
relationships involving monetary aggregates - particularly those that showed 
narrow money to be an important leading indicator of real activity, and broad 
money of the inflation rate.  
The questions implicit here about how monetary aggregates can be useful 
leading indicators of output and inflation without also playing a causative role in 
their determination were soon recognised. In the early 1990s some Bank 
researchers began to take seriously the idea that money might indeed play an active 
role in the policy-transmission mechanism (see Laidler and Robson 1993, pp. 116-
119), though earlier scepticism about this possibility also continued to be given its 
due, notably in Duguay’s already mentioned (1994) study, which presented an 
empirically estimated formal model of the mechanisms outlined in the Hansen 
lecture. Only the absence of an explicit policy reaction equation akin to a Taylor 
rule differentiates Duguay’s system from today’s standard model.24  
                                                 
24 Indeed, Duguay and Poloz (1994), in what amounts to a companion piece to this paper, dealing 
specifically with the use of model-based projections in the Bank’s policy decision making, describe the 
latter process as being “pragmatic . . . There are no simple rules, but rather a process of successive 
approximation anchored by a firm long term commitment to price stability” (p.197). Interestingly, neither 
of these papers refers to Taylor (1993). Note that Duguay (1994) did discuss the significance of both 
23 
 
From the early 1990s onwards, the Bank’s research followed both tracks 
simultaneously, in what came to be called a “multiple paradigms” approach to 
monetary policy analysis (see e.g. Walter Engert and Selody 1998, David 
Longworth 2003, Laidler 1999, 2003b).  In 2003, however, work on a possibly 
causative role for the monetary aggregates, and also on their usefulness as leading 
indicators, was to all intents and purposes abandoned, with the termination of the 
so-called “Blue Book” project that the Bank had set in motion in 1999. 25  This 
project had been given the task of generating policy advice explicitly based on the 
aggregates’ behaviour, as a counterweight to more conventional work, which by 
this time centered around the Bank’s already mentioned, and by then conventional 
(calibrated rather than estimated) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium Quarterly 
Projection Model (QPM).   Experience during the Blue Book project’s four year 
lifespan, which coincided with the middle of the Great Moderation, appeared to 
confirm scepticism about money’s capacity to add anything useful to insights 
generated by the standard approach to inflation targeting embodied in QPM, 
supplemented in the Canadian case by the Bank’s regular regional surveys of 
economic conditions, intentions and expectations. Policy recommendations 
emerging from the project seemed usually to be based on informal judgements 
about the economic situation, rather than assessments explicitly based on the 
behaviour of the aggregates  26  
It remains to be seen whether the Bank’s 2003 decision to push the monetary 
aggregates to the very margins of policy research and practice was wise for the 
longer run. John Stuart Mill’s (1848) much quoted obiter dictum has it that 
                                                                                                                                                             
broad and narrow monetary aggregates as leading indicators of output and inflation, but not as 
components of the transmission mechanism itself.  
  
25 Note that the 1990s saw an evolution of the Bank of Canada’s operating procedures which adapted them ever 
more closely to the requirements of practices based on today’s standard model and also made them less obviously 
suitable for controlling money growth. First of all, in 1994, the focus of the Bank’s operations to control interest 
rates was shifted from the market for three month treasury bills to that for overnight loans in the market for clearing 
balances, while reserve requirements were phased out. The electronic “large value transfer system” became the 
central feature of the clearing system at the end of the 1990s, with the Bank setting a target for the overnight rate 
ruling therein, fixing its discount rate at 25 basis points higher, and the interest rate on clearing balanced held with it 
25 basis points lower than this target. After encountering difficulties with a policy of providing zero overnight 
balances to this market, the Bank took to providing an extremely low level of cash reserves, unrelated to the level of 
its interest rate target, to “lubricate” it. In 2000, the Bank also moved to a system of announcing its target for the 
overnight rate at regular (six week) intervals, rather than only as and when conditions seemed to require a change in 
this variable. The system in place since 2000 thus resembles, in all its essentials, the “corridor system” described by 
Woodford (2003, Ch. 3), as he acknowledges. 
 
26 Freedman (2003 pp. 137-140) gives an account of the Bank of Canada’s Blue Book project and the reasons for its 
abandonment in the course of a wide ranging account of the declining attention paid in recent years to monetary 
aggregates by a central banks in general.  
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“There cannot . . . be a more intrinsically insignificant thing, in the economy 
of society, than money: . . . It is a machine for doing quickly and 
commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly and 
commodiously, without it: and like many other kinds of machinery, it only 
exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets out of 
order.” (Mill (1848, (1872)) p. 488) 
During 1999-2003 the machine in question, not least in Canada, was very much in 
order and functioning smoothly, and any influence of money on the real economy 
and the inflation rate could not help but be essentially invisible.  
But since 2007 that same machinery has been acting up, and so have the real 
economy and the inflation rate, though less so in Canada than in many other 
places. Perhaps, then, evidence generated since 2007, particularly in jurisdictions 
that have encountered more instability than Canada, might reveal a distinct role for 
money after all, either causative or as a useful indicator, and perhaps  widely held 
current beliefs about the irrelevance of the monetary aggregates in the policy 
process will turn out to be one of those apparently settled pieces of macroeconomic 
wisdom that from time to time find themselves in need of re-assessment in the light 
of new experience. But for the moment, the monetary aggregates remain 
marginalised in discussions of Canada’s inflation targeting regime, let alone in the 
day to day formulation of policy. 27 
      
Ideas, Events and Inflation Targeting in Retrospect  
Despite the immediate distractions created by the Great Recession, the Bank of 
Canada undertook substantial work on the possibilities for changing the policy 
regime in 2011 (see Bank of Canada 2011). 28 In particular, the options of lowering 
the targeted inflation rate, and/or of shifting to a target time path for the price level, 
received serious consideration. But from 1995 to 2007 when the Recession started, 
actual inflation had averaged almost exactly 2 percent, while that event’s local 
version was the first to occur in Canada since 1991. It is not surprising that, in 
                                                 
 
27 In the U.K. Tim Congdon (e.g. 2012) continues to advocate a central role for broad money in both the analysis of 
macroeconomic behaviour and the conduct of monetary policy, as of course in Europe and the US do self-styled 
“market monetarist” bloggers such as Scott Sumner (The Money Illusion) and Lars Christensen (The Market 
Monetarist). In the US also, William Barnett (e.g. 2012), Michael Belongia and Peter Ireland (e.g. 2015) continue to 
promote the virtues of Divisia aggregates.  
       
28 The recession in Canada was sharp, though the financial system remained stable – beyond some serious but 
localised 2007 problems in the market for asset backed commercial paper. The Bank of Canada nevertheless 
introduced a number of special liquidity schemes, and also for a while found it necessary to provide extra settlement 
balances to the clearing system, though there was no resort to quantitative easing based on outright asset purchases. 
The Bank also gave conditional forward guidance about the likely duration of its resort to rock bottom interest rates 
that seems to have worked well – unlike its earlier efforts in 1998. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, and under a 
new Governor, the Bank has explicitly announced that it will only use this tool in future under rare circumstances. 
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2011, the authorities decided to stick with the existing regime for a further five 
years, albeit embellished with an explicit recognition of the need for some 
flexibility in the face of financial turbulence. It had simply not been possible to 
establish with sufficient confidence that replacing it with something more 
ambitious would yield worthwhile gains.  
Thus a target that had been set two decades earlier as an interim goal along 
the path from uncomfortably high inflation to a state of price stability, and had 
been supported by a monetary policy framework that evolved into rather close 
conformity to what is by now the standard macroeconomic policy model in the 
academic literature, gained yet another lease on life. This paper has tried to account 
for how this came about, paying particular attention to the ways in which economic 
ideas influenced policies, which in due course created events, which then, in their 
own turn, sometimes caused those ideas to be modified or even replaced 
altogether; and so on, in a recursive process.  
Early in the story, when Governor Crow delivered the Hanson Lecture, 
competing ideas about the stability of inflation were in circulation in Canada. A 
substantial body of academic opinion had it that any fully anticipated inflation rate 
could be stable over time. The Governor and his colleagues, on the other hand, 
held a different and older view: namely, that anything short of price stability would 
likely generate expectations about inflation’s future behaviour that would 
undermine the credibility of monetary policy and the stability of its outcomes. This 
latter idea initially dominated the conduct of monetary policy. Only after the 
recession of 1990-91 did its competitor begin to exert influence, not because, at 
this early stage, it had obviously won some empirical contest, but because the 
political consequences of the recession in question required a change in policy’s 
stance.  
Now, however, after two decades of what used to be called “creeping” 
inflation deliberately and successfully supported by policy, it is surely clear that to 
base policy on the idea that low inflation can be stable was a step in the right 
direction, and that this idea’s confirmation by experience has provided much of the 
basis for inflation targeting’s longevity in Canada. A closely related academic idea, 
however, namely the natural unemployment rate hypothesis, played essentially no 
role in shaping Canadian monetary policy after 1988 - despite the arguments of 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) to the contrary.  
Even so, we have seen that it was not policies based on the Bank of 
Canada’s particular beliefs about the instability of inflation itself that derailed its 
initial program in 1990-91; rather it was measures derived from views on the 
potentially destabilising effects on inflation of exchange rate movements. These 
views’ influence also began to fade after 1993, and essentially vanished after 1998, 
again in the light of experience, and they were replaced by competing beliefs 
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drawn from the academic literature. The latter, deriving from Friedman’s (1953) 
analysis, had it that domestic monetary stability would itself support exchange rate 
stability and that supplementary attempts to influence the exchange rate directly 
were likely to interfere with that domestic stability. The growing dominance of 
these beliefs among policy makers from the early 1990s onwards also contributed 
to the success, and hence to the credibility and longevity, of Canadian inflation 
targeting. 
In these two instances, then, ideas originating among academics began to 
influence policy under pressure from events, and proved robust in the face of the 
experience that their application then generated. But the intellectual traffic was not 
one way. The Bank of Canada’s relocation of monetary policy’s “place to stand” 
from an intermediate variable - such as a target for money growth - to an ultimate 
one – a goal for the behaviour of the price level itself - represented a major break 
with much of the conventional policy wisdom of the 1980s, and even when the 
pursuit of price stability gave way to the maintenance of low inflation, this 
emphasis on policy’s ultimate goal remained in place. Among academics, the 
prevailing view well in to the 1990s remained that the complicated and drawn out 
lag structure of the transmission mechanism would render such an approach to 
monetary policy dangerously prone to instability.  Nowadays, on the contrary, it is 
just as much conventional academic wisdom that confidence among economic 
agents about the price level’s future behaviour, based upon credible policy targets, 
provides a firm anchor for the control of inflation. In this instance, then, the central 
bankers proved to be right, and academic discourse has imported their point of 
view.      
Now ex post, the widespread acceptance of this way of looking at things can 
be rationalised as reflecting the influence of the rational expectations hypothesis on 
the theory and practice of monetary policy; and certainly, during the 1980s and 
‘90s, the latter hypothesis did indeed become dominant in mainstream academic 
thinking. Furthermore the origins of many other components of today’s standard 
monetary policy model also lie in the academic literature of this period. But, as we 
have seen, by 1996, when this model’s basic characteristics were finally 
incorporated into the Bank of Canada’s own principal policy model, QPM,  
inflation targeting as we currently know it was already a going and credible 
concern, while informal versions of many of them had in any case been well 
embedded in Bank thinking from the outset. The history documented in this paper 
thus suggests that the standard model’s development by academics, including its 
deployment of the rational expectations hypothesis, had no direct causative 
influence on the evolution of Canadian inflation targeting in the years when the 
regime was becoming established. Rather what seems to have happened is that, in 
the second half of the 1990s, two parallel developments, one originating in the 
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theoretical academic literature, and the other grounded in practical policy 
experience, came together.  
In any event, perhaps Canadian inflation targeting’s robustness, consistent 
though it is with agents being guided by rational expectations, in fact resulted 
simply from them adapting their behavioural rules of thumb to experience after the 
regime’s inception, and then finding that these adapted rules worked. Now, as 
throughout the regime’s evolution,  then, competing and contradictory ideas about 
how monetary policy works are in circulation, and ideas that matter too – for 
example for the choice between inflation and price level targeting -  as the Bank of 
Canada is well aware  (see, e.g. Bank of Canada (2011), Amano et al (2009), and 
Amano et al. 2011). Furthermore, even after 2011’s cautious decision to retain 
simple inflation targets for another five years, the case for price level targeting is 
still being made (see e.g. Steven Ambler 2014) and debate about this matter is 
likely to intensify as 2016 approaches.29  Many questions about whether and how 
to introduce more flexibility into the monetary policy framework so that it can deal 
with asset market turbulence as and when this arises also remain open. The 
interaction of economic ideas and experience is an ever present feature of  the 
theory and practise of monetary policy, and it is going on as vigorously now as it 
ever did. Who knows how current discussions, not to mention the experience their 

















                                                 
29Furthermore, in both Europe and the US, “market monetarism” (see fn. 27) has revived proposals, 
popular for a while in Canada in the mid-1980s, for setting targets for nominal GDP; in doing so, it has 
placed yet another coherent plan on the agenda, though it does not seem to have attracted any advocates 
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